Humans and other animals are frequently near-optimal in their ability to integrate noisy and ambiguous sensory data to form robust percepts---which are informed both by sensory evidence and by prior expectations about the structure of the environment. It is suggested that the brain does so using the statistical structure provided by an internal model of how latent, causal factors produce the observed patterns. In dynamic environments, such integration often takes the form of \emph{postdiction}, wherein later sensory evidence affects inferences about earlier percepts. As the brain must operate in current time, without the luxury of acausal propagation of information, how does such postdictive inference come about? Here, we propose a general framework for neural probabilistic inference in dynamic models based on the distributed distributional code (DDC) representation of uncertainty, naturally extending the underlying encoding to incorporate implicit probabilistic beliefs about both present and past. We show that, as in other uses of the DDC, an inferential model can be learnt efficiently using samples from an internal model of the world. Applied to stimuli used in the context of psychophysics experiments, the framework provides an online and plausible mechanism for inference, including postdictive effects.

A major problem in motor control is understanding how the brain plans and executes proper movements in the face of delayed and noisy stimuli. A prominent framework for addressing such control problems is Optimal Feedback Control (OFC). OFC generates control actions that optimize behaviorally relevant criteria by integrating noisy sensory stimuli and the predictions of an internal model using the Kalman filter or its extensions. However, a satisfactory neural model of Kalman filtering and control is lacking because existing proposals have the following limitations: not considering the delay of sensory feedback, training in alternating phases, requiring knowledge of the noise covariance matrices, as well as that of systems dynamics. Moreover, the majority of these studies considered Kalman filtering in isolation, and not jointly with control.

A fundamental question in neuroscience is how the brain creates an internal model of the world to guide actions using sequences of ambiguous sensory information. This is naturally formulated as a reinforcement learning problem under partial observations, where an agent must estimate relevant latent variables in the world from its evidence, anticipate possible future states, and choose actions that optimize total expected reward. This problem can be solved by control theory, which allows us to find the optimal actions for a given system dynamics and objective function. However, animals often appear to behave suboptimally.

Such internal models allow for planning and potentially optimal action generation, e.g., they enable optimal catching strategies where humans predict the interception point and move there as fast as mechanically possible to await the ball. Clearly, there exist situations where latencies of the catching task require such strategies (e.g., when

Recurrent networks of spiking neurons (RSNNs) underlie the astounding computing and learning capabilities of the brain. But computing and learning capabilities of RSNN models have remained poor, at least in comparison with artificial neural networks (ANNs). We address two possible reasons for that. One is that RSNNs in the brain are not randomly connected or designed according to simple rules, and they do not start learning as a tabula rasa network. Rather, RSNNs in the brain were optimized for their tasks through evolution, development, and prior experience. Details of these optimization processes are largely unknown. But their functional contribution can be approximated through powerful optimization methods, such as backpropagation through time (BPTT). A second major mismatch between RSNNs in the brain and models is that the latter only show a small fraction of the dynamics of neurons and synapses in the brain. We include neurons in our RSNN model that reproduce one prominent dynamical process of biological neurons that takes place at the behaviourally relevant time scale of seconds: neuronal adaptation.

Recurrent networks of spiking neurons (RSNNs) underlie the astounding computing and learning capabilities of the brain. But computing and learning capabilities of RSNN models have remained poor, at least in comparison with artificial neural networks (ANNs). We address two possible reasons for that. One is that RSNNs in the brain are not randomly connected or designed according to simple rules, and they do not start learning as a tabula rasa network. Rather, RSNNs in the brain were optimized for their tasks through evolution, development, and prior experience. Details of these optimization processes are largely unknown. But their functional contribution can be approximated through powerful optimization methods, such as backpropagation through time (BPTT). A second major mismatch between RSNNs in the brain and models is that the latter only show a small fraction of the dynamics of neurons and synapses in the brain. We include neurons in our RSNN model that reproduce one prominent dynamical process of biological neurons that takes place at the behaviourally relevant time scale of seconds: neuronal adaptation.

Chung et al., 2015; Fraccaro et al., 2017) represent states Fraccaro; or Johnson et al., 2016), but currently only implemented for R2: Encoding functions: indeed, we chose fixed but random γ . Gradient descent would be a natural choice, albeit with debatable biological plausibility. If accepted, we will include these new experimental results. Line 92: Indeed, DDC activities encode a distribution or belief about a random variable - we will amend the text. This could follow "normal" learning rules; with the DDC again ensuring that uncertainty is handled correctly.

However, animals often appear to behave suboptimally.

The regulator theorem states that, under certain conditions, any optimal controller must embody a model of the system it regulates, grounding the idea that controllers embed, explicitly or implicitly, internal models of the controlled. This principle underpins neuroscience and predictive brain theories like the Free-Energy Principle or Kolmogorov/Algorithmic Agent theory. However, the theorem is only proven in limited settings. Here, we treat the deterministic, closed, coupled world-regulator system $(W,R)$ as a single self-delimiting program $p$ via a constant-size wrapper that produces the world output string~$x$ fed to the regulator. We analyze regulation from the viewpoint of the algorithmic complexity of the output, $K(x)$. We define $R$ to be a \emph{good algorithmic regulator} if it \emph{reduces} the algorithmic complexity of the readout relative to a null (unregulated) baseline $\varnothing$, i.e., \[ Δ= K\big(O_{W,\varnothing}\big) - K\big(O_{W,R}\big) > 0. \] We then prove that the larger $Δ$ is, the more world-regulator pairs with high mutual algorithmic information are favored. More precisely, a complexity gap $Δ> 0$ yields \[ \Pr\big((W,R)\mid x\big) \le C\,2^{\,M(W{:}R)}\,2^{-Δ}, \] making low $M(W{:}R)$ exponentially unlikely as $Δ$ grows. This is an AIT version of the idea that ``the regulator contains a model of the world.'' The framework is distribution-free, applies to individual sequences, and complements the Internal Model Principle. Beyond this necessity claim, the same coding-theorem calculus singles out a \emph{canonical scalar objective} and implicates a \emph{planner}. On the realized episode, a regulator behaves \emph{as if} it minimized the conditional description length of the readout.